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Abstract
Bitcoin is the most successful cryptocurrency so far. This
is mainly due to its novel consensus algorithm, which is
based on proof-of-work combined with a cryptographically-
protected data structure and a rewarding scheme that incen-
tivizes nodes to participate. However, despite its unprece-
dented success Bitcoin suffers from many inefficiencies. For
instance, Bitcoin’s consensus mechanism has been proved to
be incentive-incompatible, its high reward variance causes
centralization, and its hardcoded deflation raises questions
about its long-term sustainability.
In this work, we revise the Bitcoin consensus mechanism
by proposing StrongChain, a scheme that introduces trans-
parency and incentivizes participants to collaborate rather
than to compete. The core design of our protocol is to
reflect and utilize the computing power aggregated on the
blockchain which is invisible and “wasted” in Bitcoin today.
Introducing relatively easy, although important changes to
Bitcoin’s design enables us to improve many crucial aspects
of Bitcoin-like cryptocurrencies making it more secure, ef-
ficient, and profitable for participants. We thoroughly an-
alyze our approach and we present an implementation of
StrongChain. The obtained results confirm its efficiency, se-
curity, and deployability.
1 Introduction
One of the main novelties of Bitcoin [28] is Nakamoto con-
sensus. This mechanism enabled the development of a per-
missionless, anonymous, and Internet-scale consensus pro-
tocol, and combined with incentive mechanisms allowed
Bitcoin to emerge as the first decentralized cryptocurrency.
Bitcoin is successful beyond all expectations, has inspired
many other projects, and has started new research directions.
Nakamoto consensus is based on proof-of-work (PoW) [8] in
order to mitigate Sybil attacks [6]. To prevent modifications,
∗This work was done while the author was at SUTD.
a cryptographically-protected append-only list [2] is intro-
duced. This list consists of transactions grouped into blocks
and is usually referred to as a blockchain. Every active pro-
tocol participant (called a miner) collects transactions sent
by users and tries to solve a computationally-hard puzzle in
order to be able to write to the blockchain (the process of
solving the puzzle is called mining). When a valid solution
is found, it is disseminated along with the transactions that
the miner wishes to append. Other miners verify this data
and, if valid, append it to their replicated blockchains. The
miner that has found a solution is awarded by a) the system,
via a rewarding scheme programmed into the protocol, and
b) fees paid by transaction senders. All monetary transfers
in Bitcoin are expressed in its native currency (called bitcoin,
abbreviated as BTC) whose supply is limited by the protocol.
Bitcoin has started an advent of decentralized cryptocur-
rency systems and as the first proposed and deployed sys-
tem in this class is surprisingly robust. However, there
are multiple drawbacks of Bitcoin that undermine its secu-
rity promises and raise questions about its future. Bitcoin
has been proved to be incentive-incompatible [9, 11, 39, 47].
Namely, in some circumstances, the miners’ best strategy is
to not announce their found solutions immediately, but in-
stead withhold them for some time period. Another issue is
that the increasing popularity of the system tends towards its
centralization. Strong competition between miners resulted
in a high reward variance, thus to stabilize their revenue
miners started grouping their computing power by forming
mining pools. Over time, mining pools have come to domi-
nate the computing power of the system, and although they
are beneficial for miners, large mining pools are risky for
the system as they have multiple ways of abusing the pro-
tocol [9, 11, 18, 39]. Recently, researchers rigorously ana-
lyzed one of the impacts of Bitcoin’s deflation [4, 27, 47].
Their results indicate that Bitcoin may be unsustainable in
the long term, mainly due to decreasing miners’ rewards that
will eventually stop completely. Besides that, unusually for
a transaction system, Bitcoin is designed to favor availability
over consistency. This choice was motivated by its open and
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permissionless spirit, but in the case of inconsistencies (i.e.,
forks in the blockchain) the system can be slow to converge.
Motivated by these drawbacks, we propose StrongChain, a
simple yet powerful revision of the Bitcoin consensus mech-
anism. Our main intuition is to design a system such that the
mining process is more transparent and collaborative, i.e.,
miners get better knowledge about the mining power of the
system and they are incentivized to solve puzzles together
rather than compete. In order to achieve it, in the heart of the
StrongChain’s design we employ weak solutions, i.e., puzzle
solutions with a PoW that is significant yet insufficient for a
standard solution. We design our system, such that a) weak
solutions are part of the consensus protocol, b) their find-
ers are rewarded independently, and c) miners have incen-
tives to announce own solutions and append solutions of oth-
ers immediately. We thoroughly analyze our approach and
show that with these changes, the mining process is becom-
ing more transparent, collaborative, secure, efficient, and de-
centralized. Surprisingly, we also show how our approach
can improve the freshness properties offered by Bitcoin. We
present an implementation and evaluation of our scheme.
2 Background and Problem Definition
2.1 Nakamoto Consensus and Bitcoin
The Nakamoto consensus protocol allows decentralized and
distributed network comprised of mutually distrusting par-
ticipants to reach an agreement on the state of the global dis-
tributed ledger [28]. The distributed ledger can be regarded
as a linked list of blocks, referred to as the blockchain, which
serializes and confirms “transactions”. To resolve any forks
of the blockchain the protocol specifies to always accept the
longest chain as the current one. Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer
cryptocurrency that deploys Nakamoto consensus as its core
mechanism to avoid double-spending. Transactions spend-
ing bitcoins are announced to the Bitcoin network, where
miners validate, serialize all non-included transactions, and
try to create (mine) a block of transactions with a PoW em-
bedded into the block header. A valid block must fulfill the
condition that for a cryptographic hash function H, the hash
value of the block header is less than the target T .
Brute-forcing the nonce (together with some other change-
able data fields) is virtually the only way to produce the PoW,
which costs computational resources of the miners. To in-
centivize miners, the Bitcoin protocol allows the miner who
finds a block to insert a special transaction (see below) mint-
ing a specified amount of new bitcoins and collecting trans-
action fees offered by the included transactions, which are
transferred to an account chosen by the miner. Currently,
every block mints 12.5 new bitcoins. This amount is halved
every four years, upper-bounding the number of bitcoins that
will be created to a fixed total of 21 million coins. It implies
that after around the year 2140, no new coins will be created,
and the transaction fees will be the only source of reward for
miners. Because of its design, Bitcoin is a deflationary cur-
rency.
The overall hash rate of the Bitcoin network and the dif-
ficulty of the PoW determine how long it takes to generate
a new block for the whole network (the block interval). To
stabilize the block interval at about 10 minutes for the con-
stantly changing total mining power, the Bitcoin network ad-
justs the target T every 2016 blocks (about two weeks, i.e., a
difficulty window) according to the following formula
Tnew = Told · Time of the last 2016 blocks2016 ·10 minutes . (1)
In simple terms, the difficulty increases if the network is find-
ing blocks faster than every 10 minutes, and decrease oth-
erwise. With dynamic difficulty, Nakamoto’s longest chain
rule was considered as a bug,1 as it is trivial to produce long
chains that have low difficulty. The rule was replaced by the
strongest-PoW chain rule where competing chains are mea-
sured in terms of PoW they aggregated. As long as there is
one chain with the highest PoW, this chain is chosen as the
current one.
Bitcoin introduced and uses the unspent transaction out-
put model. The validity of a Bitcoin transaction is verified
by executing a script proving that the transaction sender is
authorized to redeem unspent coins. The only exception is
the first transaction in the transaction list of a block, which
implements how the newly minted bitcoins and transaction
fees are distributed. It is called a coinbase transaction and
it contains the amount of bitcoins (the sum of newly minted
coins and the fees derived from all the transactions) and the
beneficiary (typically the creator of the block). Also, the
Bitcoin scripting language offers a mechanism (OP RETURN)
for recording data on the blockchain, which facilitates third-
party applications built-on Bitcoin.
Bitcoin proposes the simplified payment verification
(SPV) protocol, that allows resource-limited clients to ver-
ify that a transaction is indeed included in a block provided
only with the block header and a short transaction’s inclusion
proof. The key advantage of the protocol is that SPV clients
can verify the existence of a transaction without download-
ing or storing the whole block. SPV clients are provided only
with block headers and on-demand request from the network
inclusion proofs of the transactions they are interested in.
In the original white paper, Nakamoto heuristically argues
that the consensus protocol remains secure as long as a ma-
jority (> 50%) of the participants’ computing power hon-
estly follow the rule specified by the protocol, which is com-
patible with their own economic incentives.
1https://goo.gl/thhusi
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2.2 Bitcoin Mining Issues
Despite its popularity, Nakamoto consensus and Bitcoin suf-
fer from multiple issues. Bitcoin mining is not always
incentive-compatible. By deviating from the protocol and
strategically withholding found blocks, a miner in posses-
sion of a proportion α of the total computational power may
occupy more than α portion of the blocks on the blockchain,
and therefore gain disproportionally higher payoffs with re-
spect to her share [1, 11, 39]. More specifically, an attacker
tries to create a private chain by keeping found blocks secret
as long as the chain is in an advantageous position with one
or more blocks more than the public branch. She releases her
private chain only when the public chain has almost caught
up, hence invalidating the public branch and all the efforts
made by the honest miners. This kind of attack, called self-
ish mining, can be more efficient when a well-connected self-
ish miner’s computational power exceeds a certain threshold
(around more than 30%). Thus, selfish mining does not pay
off if the mining power is sufficiently decentralized.
Unfortunately, the miners have an impulse to central-
ize their computing resources due to Bitcoin’s rewarding
scheme. In Bitcoin, rewarding is a zero-sum game and only
the lucky miner who manages to get her block accepted re-
ceives the reward, while others who indeed contributed com-
putational resources to produce the PoW are completely in-
visible and ignored. Increasing mining competition leads to
an extremely high variance of the payoffs of a miner with
a limited computational power. A solo miner may need to
wait months or years to receive any reward at all. As a
consequence, miners are motivated to group their resources
and form mining pools, that divide work among pool partici-
pants and share the rewards according to their contributions.
As of November 2018, only five largest pools account for
more than 65% of the mining power of the whole Bitcoin
network.2 Such mining pools not only undermine the de-
centralization property of the system but also raise various
in-pool or cross-pool security issues [5, 9, 22, 37].
Another seemingly harmless characteristic of Bitcoin is
its finite monetary supply. However, researchers in their re-
cent work [4, 27, 47] investigate the system dynamics when
incentives coming from transaction fees are non-negligible
compared with block rewards (in one extreme case the in-
centives come only from fees). They provide analysis and
evidence, indicating an undesired system degradation due
to the rational and self-interested participants. Firstly, such
a system incentivizes large miner coalitions, increasing the
system centralization even more. Secondly, it leads to a min-
ing gap where miners would avoid mining when the avail-
able fees are insufficient. Even worse, rational miners tend
to mine on chains that do not include available transactions
(and their fees), rather than following the block selection rule
specified by the protocol, resulting in a backlog of transac-
2https://btc.com/stats/pool?pool_mode=month
tions. Finally, in the sole transaction fee regime, selfish min-
ing attacks are efficient for miners with arbitrarily low min-
ing power, regardless of their network connection qualities.
These results suggest that making the block reward perma-
nent and accepting the monetary inflation may be a wise de-
sign choice to ensure the stability of the cryptocurrency in
the long run.
Moreover, the chain selection rule (i.e., the strongest chain
is accepted), together with the network delay, occasionally
lead to forks, where two or more blocks pointing to the
same block are created around the same time, causing the
participants to have different views of the current system
state. Such conflicting views will eventually be resolved
since with a high probability one branch will finally beat
the others (then the blocks from the “losing” chain become
stale blocks). The process of fork resolution is quite slow,
as blocks have the same PoW weight and they arrive in 10-
minutes intervals (on average).
Finally, the freshness properties provided by Bitcoin are
questionable. By design, the Bitcoin blockchain preserves
the order of blocks and transactions, however, the accurate
estimation of time of these events is challenging [43], de-
spite the fact that each block has an associated timestamp.
A block’s timestamp is accepted if a) it is greater than the
median timestamp of the previous eleven blocks, and b) it is
less than the network time plus two hours.3 This gives sig-
nificant room for manipulation — in theory, a timestamp can
differ in hours from the actual time since it is largely deter-
mined by a single block creator. In fact, as time cannot be
accurately determined from the timestamps, the capabilities
of the Bitcoin protocol as a timestamping service are limited,
which may lead to severe attacks by itself [3, 17].
2.3 Requirements
For the purpose of revising a consensus protocol of PoW
blockchains in a secure, well-incentivized, and seamless
way, we define the following respective requirements:
• Security – the scheme should improve the security of
Nakamoto consensus by mitigating known attack vec-
tors and preventing new ones. In essence, the scheme
should be incentive-compatible, such that miners bene-
fit from following the consensus rules and have no gain
from violating them.
• Reward Variance – another objective is to minimize
the variance in rewards. This requirement is crucial
for decentralization since a high reward variance is the
main motivation of individual miners to join centralized
mining pools. Centralization is undesirable as large-
enough mining pools can attack the Bitcoin protocol.
• Chain Quality – the scheme should provide a high
chain quality, which usually is described using the two
following properties.
3https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Block_timestamp
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– Mining Power Utilization – the ratio between
the mining power on the main chain and the min-
ing power of the entire blockchain network. This
property describes the performance of mining and
its ideal value is 1, which denotes that all mining
power of the system contributes to the “official” or
“canonical” chain. A high mining power utiliza-
tion implies a low stale block rate.
– Fairness – the protocol should be fair, i.e., a
miner should earn rewards proportionally to the
resources invested by her in mining. We denote
a miner with α of the global mining power as an
α-strong miner.
• Efficiency and Practicality – the scheme should not in-
troduce any significant computational, storage, or band-
width overheads. This is especially important since Bit-
coin works as a replicated state machine, therefore all
full nodes replicate data and the validation process. In
particular, the block validation time, its size, and over-
heads of SPV clients should be at least similar as to-
day. Moreover, the protocol should not introduce any
assumptions that would be misaligned with Bitcoin’s
spirit and perceived as unacceptable by the commu-
nity. In particular, the scheme should not introduce any
trusted parties and should not assume strong synchro-
nization of nodes (like global and reliable timestamps).
3 High-level Overview
3.1 Design Rationale
Our first observation is that Bitcoin mining is not transpar-
ent. It is difficult to quickly estimate the computing power
of the different participants, because the only indicator is the
found blocks. After all, blocks arrive with a low frequency,
and each block is equal in terms of its implied computational
power. Consequently, the only way of resolving forks is to
wait for a stronger chain to emerge, which can be a time-
consuming process. A related issue is block-withholding-
like attacks (e.g., selfish mining) which are based on the ob-
servation that sometimes it is profitable for an attacker to
deviate from the protocol by postponing the announcement
of new solutions. We see transparency as a helpful prop-
erty also in this context. Ideally, non-visible (hidden) so-
lutions should be penalized, however, in practice it is chal-
lenging to detect and prove that a solution was hidden. We
observe that an alternative way of mitigating these attacks
would be to promote visible solutions, such that with more
computing power aggregated around them they get stronger.
This would incentivize miners to publish their solutions im-
mediately, since keeping it secret may be too risky as other
miners could strengthen a competing potential (future) so-
lution over time. Finally, supported by recent research re-
sults [4, 11, 27, 39, 47], we envision that redesigning the Bit-
coin reward scheme is unavoidable to keep the system sus-
tainable and more secure. Beside the deflation issues (see
Section 2.2), the reward scheme in Bitcoin is a zero-sum
game rewarding only lucky miners and ignoring all effort of
other participants. That causes fierce competition between
miners and a high reward variance, which stimulates min-
ers to collaborate, but within mining pools, introducing more
risk to the system. We aim to design a system where miners
can benefit from collaboration but without introducing cen-
tralization risks.
3.2 Overview
Motivated by these observations, we see weak puzzle so-
lutions, currently invisible and “wasted” in Bitcoin, as a
promising direction. Miners exchanging them could make
the protocol more transparent as announcing them could re-
flect the current distribution of computational efforts on the
network. Furthermore, if included in consensus rules, they
could give blocks a better granularity in terms of PoW, and
incentivize miners to collaborate. In our scheme, miners
solve a puzzle as today but in addition to publishing solu-
tions, they exchange weak solutions too (i.e., almost-solved
puzzles). The lucky miner publishes her solution that em-
beds gathered weak solutions (pointing to the same previous
block) of other miners. Such a published block better reflects
the aggregated PoW of a block, which in the case of a fork
can indicate that more mining power is focused on a given
branch (i.e., actually it proves that more computing power
“believes” that the given branch is correct). Another crucial
change is to redesign the Bitcoin reward system, such that
the finders of weak solutions are also rewarded. Following
lessons learned from mining pool attacks, instead of sharing
rewards among miners, our scheme rewards weak solutions
proportionally to their PoW contributed to a given block and
all rewards are independent of other solutions of the block.
(Note, that this change requires a Bitcoin hard fork.)
There are a few intuitions behind these design choices.
First, a selfish miner finding a new block takes a high risk
by keeping this block secret. This is because blocks have
a better granularity due to honest miners exchanging partial
solutions and strengthening their prospective block, which in
the case of a fork would be stronger than the older block kept
secret (i.e., the block of the selfish miner). Secondly, min-
ers are actually incentivized to collaborate by a) exchang-
ing their weak solutions, and b) by appending weak solu-
tions submitted by other miners. For the former case, miners
are rewarded whenever their solutions are appended, hence
keeping them secret can be unprofitable for them. For the
latter case, a miner appending weak solutions of others only
increases the strength of her potential block, and moreover,
appending these solutions does not negatively influence the
miner’s potential reward. Finally, our approach comes with
another benefit. Proportional rewarding of weak solutions
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decreases the reward variance, thus miners do not have to
join large mining pools in order to stabilize their revenue.
This could lead to a higher decentralization of mining power
on the network.
In the following sections, we describe details of our sys-
tem, show its analysis, and report on its implementation.
4 StrongChain Details
4.1 Mining
As in Bitcoin, in StrongChain miners authenticate transac-
tions by collecting them into blocks whose headers are pro-
tected by a certain amount of PoW. A simplified description
of a block mining procedure in StrongChain is presented as
the mineBlock() function in Algorithm 1. Namely, every
miner tries to solve a PoW puzzle by computing the hash
function over a newly created header. The header is con-
stantly being changed by modifying its nonce field,4 until a
valid hash value is found. Whenever a miner finds a header
hdr whose hash value h = H(hdr) is smaller than the strong
target Ts, i.e., a h that satisfies the following:
h < Ts,
then the corresponding block is announced to the network
and becomes, with all its transactions and metadata, part of
the blockchain. We refer to headers of included blocks as
strong headers.
One of the main differences with Bitcoin is that our min-
ing protocol handles also headers whose hash values do not
meet the strong target Ts, but still are low enough to prove a
significant PoW. We call such a header a weak header and its
hash value h has to satisfy the following:
Ts ≤ h < Tw, (2)
where Tw > Ts and Tw is called the weak target.
Whenever a miner finds such a block header, she adds it
to her local list of weak headers (i.e., weakHdrsTmp) and
she propagates the header among all miners. Then every
miner that receives this information first validates it (see on-
RecvWeakHdr()) by checking whether
• the header points to the last strong header,
• its other fields are correct (see Section 4.2),
• and Equation 2 is satisfied.
Afterward, miners append the header to their lists of weak
headers. We do not limit the number of weak headers ap-
pended, although this number is correlated with the Tw/Ts
ratio (see Section 5).
Finally, miners continue the mining process in order to
find a strong header. In this process, a miner keeps creat-
ing candidate headers by computing hash values and check-
ing whether the strong target is met. Every candidate header
4In fact, other fields can be modified too if needed.
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode of StrongChain functions.
function mineBlock()
weakHdrsTmp← /0;
for nonce ∈ {0,1,2, ...} do
hdr← createHeader(nonce);
/* check if the header meets the strong target */
htmp← H(hdr);
if htmp < Ts then
B← createBlock(hdr,weakHdrsTmp,Txs);
broadcast(B);
return; /* signal to mine with the new block */
/* check if the header meets the weak target */
if htmp < Tw then
weakHdrsTmp.add(hdr);
broadcast(hdr);
function onRecvWeakHdr(hdr)
hw← H(hdr);
assert(Ts ≤ hw < Tw and validHeader(hdr));
assert(hdr.PrevHash == H(lastBlock.hdr)) ;
weakHdrsTmp.add(hdr);
function rewardBlock(B)
/* reward block finder with R */
reward(B.hdr.Coinbase,R+B.T xFees);
w← γ ∗Ts/Tw; /* reward weak headers proportionally */
for hdr ∈ B.weakHdrSet do
reward(hdr.Coinbase,w∗ c∗R);
function validateBlock(B)
assert(H(B.hdr)< Ts and validHeader(B.hdr));
assert(B.hdr.PrevHash == H(lastBlock.hdr)) ;
assert(validTransactions(B));
for hdr ∈ B.weakHdrSet do
assert(Ts ≤ H(hdr)< Tw and validHeader(hdr));
assert(hdr.PrevHash == H(lastBlock.hdr));
function chainPoW(chain)
sum← 0;
for B ∈ chain do
/* for each block compute its aggregated PoW */
Ts← B.hdr.Target;
sum← sum+Tmax/Ts;
for hdr ∈ B.weakHdrSet do
sum← sum+Tmax/Tw;
return sum;
function getTimestamp(B)
sumT← B.hdr.Timestamp;
sumW← 1.0;
/* average timestamp by the aggregated PoW */
w← Ts/Tw;
for hdr ∈ B.weakHdrSet do
sumT ← sumT +w∗hdr.Timestamp;
sumW ← sumW +w;
return sumT/sumW ;
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“protects” all collected weak headers (note that all of these
weak headers point to the same previous strong header).
In order to keep the number of found weak headers close
to a constant value, StrongChain adjusts the difficulty Tw of
weak headers every 2016 blocks immediately following the
adjustment of the difficulty Ts of the strong headers accord-
ing to Equation 1, such that the ratio Tw/Ts is kept at a con-
stant (we discuss its value in Section 5).
4.2 Block Layout and Validation
A block in our scheme consists of transactions, a list of weak
headers, and a strong header that authenticates these transac-
tions and weak headers. Strong and weak headers in our
system inherit the fields from Bitcoin headers and addition-
ally enrich it by a new field. A block header consists of the
following fields:
PrevHash: is a hash of the previous block header,
Target: is the value encoding the current target defining the
difficulty of finding new blocks,
Nonce: is a nonce, used to generate PoW,
Timestamp: is a Unix timestamp,
TxRoot: is the root of the Merkle tree [24] aggregating all
transactions of the block, and
Coinbase: represents an address of the miner that will re-
ceive a reward.
As our protocol rewards finders of weak headers (see details
in Section 4.4), every weak header has to be accompanied
with the information necessary to identify its finder. Oth-
erwise, a finder of a strong block could maliciously claim
that some (or all) weak headers were found by her and get
rewards for them. For this purpose and for efficiency, we in-
troduced a new 20B-long header field named Coinbase. With
the introduction of this field, StrongChain headers are 100B
long. But on the other hand, there is no longer any need
for Bitcoin coinbase transactions (see Section 2.1), as all re-
wards are determined from headers.
In our scheme, weak headers are exchanged among nodes
as part of a block, hence it is necessary to protect the in-
tegrity of all weak headers associated with the block. To re-
alize it, we introduce a special transaction, called a binding
transaction, which contains a hash value computed over the
weak headers. This transaction is the first transaction of each
block and it protects the collected weak headers. Whenever
a strong header is found, it is announced together with all its
transactions and collected weak headers, therefore, this field
protects all associated weak headers. To encode this field we
utilize the OP RETURN operation as follows:
OP RETURN H(hdr0‖hdr1‖...‖hdrn), (3)
where hdri is a weak header pointing to the previous strong
header. Since weak headers have redundant fields (the
PrevHash, Target, and Version fields have the same values as
Nonce
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Figure 1: An example of a blockchain fragment with strong head-
ers, weak headers, and binding and regular transactions.
the strong header), we propose to save bandwidth and stor-
age by not including these fields into the data of a block. This
modification reduces the size of a weak header from 100B to
60B only, which is especially important for SPV clients who
keep downloading new block headers.
With our approach, a newly mined and announced block
can encompass multiple weak headers. Weak headers, in
contrast to strong headers, are not used to authenticate trans-
actions, and they are even stored and exchanged without their
corresponding transactions. Instead, the main purpose of
including weak headers it to contribute and reflect the ag-
gregated mining power concentrated on a given branch of
the blockchain. We present a fragment of a blockchain of
StrongChain in Figure 1. As depicted in the figure, each
block contains a single strong header, transactions, and a set
of weak headers aggregated via a binding transaction.
On receiving a new block, miners validate the block by
checking the following (see validateBlock() in Algorithm 1):
1. The strong header is protected by the PoW and points
to the previous strong header.
2. Header fields have correct values (i.e., the version, tar-
get, and timestamp are set correctly).
3. All included transactions are correct and protected by
the strong header. This check also includes checking
that all weak headers collected are protected by a bind-
ing transaction included in the block.
4. All included weak headers are correct: a) they meet the
targets as specified in Equation 2, b) their PrevHash
fields point to the previous strong header, and c) their
version, targets, and timestamps have correct values.
If the validation is successful, the block is accepted as part
of the blockchain.
4.3 Forks
One of the main advantages of our approach is that blocks
reflect their aggregated mining power more precisely. Each
block beside its strong header contains multiple weak head-
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…weak header

strong header

transactions

block
Bi-2 Bi-1 Bi Bi+1
Bi’
Figure 2: An example of a forked blockchain in StrongChain.
ers that contribute to the block’s PoW. In the case of a fork,
our scheme relies on the strongest chain rule, however, the
PoW is computed differently than in Bitcoin. For every chain
its PoW is calculated as presented by the chainPoW() proce-
dure in Algorithm 1. Every chain is parsed and for each of
its blocks the PoW is calculated by adding:
1. the PoW of the strong header, computed as Tmax/Ts,
where Tmax is the maximum target value, and
2. the accumulated PoW of all associated weak headers,
counting each weak header equally as Tmax/Tw.
Then the chain’s PoW is expressed as just the sum of all its
blocks’ PoW. Such an aggregated chain’s PoW is compared
with the competing chain(s). The chain with the largest ag-
gregated PoW is determined as the current one. As diffi-
culty in our protocol changes over time, the strong target Ts
and PoW of weak headers are relative to the maximum tar-
get value Tmax. We assume that nodes of the network check
whether every difficulty window is computed correctly (we
skipped this check in our algorithms for easy description).
Including and empowering weak headers in our protocol
moves away from Bitcoin’s “binary” granularity and gives
blocks better expression of the PoW they convey. An ex-
ample is presented in Figure 2. For instance, nodes having
the blocks Bi and B′i can immediately decide to follow the
block Bi as it has more weak headers associated, thus it has
accumulated more PoW than the block B′i.
An exception to this rule is when miners solve conflicts.
Namely, on receiving a new block, miners run the algorithm
as presented, however, they also take into consideration PoW
contributions of known weak headers that point to the last
blocks. For instance, for a one-block-long fork within the
same difficulty window, if a block B includes l weak headers
and a miner knows of k weak headers pointing to B, then
that miner will select B over any competing block B′ that
includes l′ weak and has k′ known weak headers pointing to
it if l + k > l′+ k′. Note that this rule incentivizes miners to
propagate their solutions as quickly as possible as competing
blocks become “stronger” over time.
4.4 Rewarding Scheme
The rewards distribution is another crucial aspect of
StrongChain and it is presented by the rewardBlock() pro-
cedure from Algorithm 1. The miner that found the strong
header receives the full reward R. Moreover, in contrast to
Bitcoin, where only the “lucky” miner is paid the full reward,
in our scheme all miners that have contributed to the block’s
PoW (i.e., whose weak headers are included) are paid by
commensurate rewards to the provided PoW. A weak header
finder receive a fraction of R, i.e., γ ∗ c ∗R ∗Ts/Tw, as a re-
ward for its corresponding solution contributing to the total
PoW of a particular branch, where the γ parameter influences
the relative impact of weak header rewards and c is just a
scaling constant (we discuss their potential values and im-
plications in Section 5). Moreover, we do not limit weak
header rewards and miners can get multiple rewards for their
weak headers within a single block. Similar reward mech-
anisms are present in today’s mining pools (see Section 8),
but unlike them, weak header rewards in StrongChain are in-
dependent of each other. Therefore, the reward scheme is
not a zero-sum game and miners cannot increase their own
rewards by dropping weak headers of others (actually, as
we discuss in Section 5, they can only lose since their po-
tential solutions would have less PoW without others’ weak
headers). Furthermore, weak header rewards decrease signif-
icantly the mining variance as miners can get steady revenue,
making the system more decentralized and collaborative.
As mentioned before, the number of weak headers of a
block is unlimited, they are rewarded independently (i.e., do
not share any reward), and all block rewards in our system
are proportional to the PoW contributed. In such a setting,
a mechanism incentivizing miners to terminate a block cre-
ation is needed (without such a mechanism, miners could
keep creating huge blocks with weak headers only). In order
to achieve this, StrongChain always attributes block transac-
tion fees (B.T xFees) to the finder of the strong header (who
also receives the full reward R).
Note that in our rewarding scheme, the amount of newly
minted coins is always at least R, and consequently, unlike
Bitcoin or Ethereum [48], the total supply of the currency
in our protocol is not upper-bounded. This design decision
is made in accordance with recent results on the long-term
instability of deflationary cryptocurrencies [4, 27, 47].
4.5 Timestamps
In StrongChain, we follow the Bitcoin rules on constrain-
ing timestamps (see Section 2.1), however, we redefine how
block timestamps are interpreted. Instead of solely relying
on a timestamp put by the miner who mined the block, block
timestamps in our system are derived from the strong header
and all weak headers included in the corresponding block.
The algorithm to derive a block’s timestamp is presented as
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getTimestamp() in Algorithm 1. A block’s timestamp is de-
termined as a weighted average timestamp over the strong
header’s timestamp and all timestamps of the weak head-
ers included in the block. The strong header’s timestamp
has a weight of 1, while weights of weak header timestamps
are determined as their PoW contributed (namely, a weak
header’s timestamp has a weight of the ratio between the
strong target and the weak target). Therefore, the timestamp
value is adjusted proportionally to the mining power asso-
ciated with a given block. That change reflects an average
time of the block creation and mitigates miners that inten-
tionally or misconfigured put incorrect timestamps into the
blockchain. We show the effectiveness of this approach in
Section 5.5.
4.6 SPV Clients
Our protocol supports light SPV clients. With every new
block, an SPV client is updated with the following informa-
tion:
hdr,hdr0,hdr1, ...,hdrn,BTproof , (4)
where hdr is a strong header, hdri are associated weak head-
ers, and BTproof is an inclusion proof of a binding transac-
tion that contains a hash over the weak headers (see Equa-
tion 3). Note that headers contain redundant fields, thus as
described in Section 4.2, they can be provided to SPV clients
efficiently.
With this data, the client verifies fields of all headers, com-
putes the PoW of the block (analogous, as in chainPoW()
from Algorithm 1), and validates the BTproof proof to check
whether all weak headers are correct, and whether the trans-
action is part of the blockchain (the proof is validated against
TxRoot of hdr). Afterward, the client saves the strong header
hdr and its computed PoW, while other messages (the weak
headers and the proof) can be dropped.
5 Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the requirements discussed in
Section 2.3. We start with analyzing StrongChain’s effi-
ciency and practicality. Next, we study how our design helps
with reward variance, chain quality, and security.
5.1 Efficiency and Practicality
For the efficiency, it is important to consider the main source
of additional load on the bandwidth, storage, and processing
power of the nodes: the weak headers. Hence, in the fol-
lowing section we analyze the probability distribution of the
number of weak headers. Next, we discuss the value of the
impact of the parametrization on the average block rewards.
5.1.1 Number of Weak Headers
In Bitcoin, we assume that hashes are drawn randomly be-
tween 0 and Tmax = 2256 − 1. Hence, a single hash be-
ing smaller than Tw is a Bernoulli trial with parameter
pw = Tw/2256. The number of hashes tried until a weak
header is found is therefore geometrically distributed, and
the time in seconds between two weak headers is approxi-
mately exponentially distributed with rate η pw, where η is
the total hash rate per second and pw is chosen such that
η pw ≈ 1/600. When a weak header is found, it is also a
strong block with probability ps/pw (where ps = Ts/2256),
which is again a Bernoulli trial. Hence, the probability
distribution of the number of weak headers found between
two strong blocks is that of the number of trials before the
first successful trial — as such, it also follows a geometric
distribution, but with mean pw/ps − 1.5 For example, for
Tw/Ts = 210 this means that the average number of weak
headers per block equals 1023. With 60 bytes per weak
header (see Section 4.2) and 1MB per Bitcoin block, this
would mean that the load increases by little over 6% on av-
erage with a small computational overhead introduced (see
details in Section 7). The probability of having more than
16667 headers (or 1MB) in a block would equal.6(
1− ps
pw
)16668
=
(
1−2−10
)16668 ≈ 8.4603 ·10−8.
Since around 51,000 Bitcoin blocks are found per year, this
is expected to happen roughly once every 230 years.
5.1.2 Total Rewards
To ease the comparison to the Bitcoin protocol, we can en-
force the same average mining reward per block (currently
12.5 BTC). Let R denote Bitcoin’s mining reward. Since we
reward weak headers as well as strong blocks, we need to
scale all mining rewards by a constant c to ensure that the
total reward remains unchanged — this is done in the re-
wardBlock function in Algorithm 1. As argued previously,
we reward all weak headers equally by γRTs/Tw. Since
the average number of weak headers per strong block is
Tw/Ts−1, this means that the expected total reward per
block (i.e., strong block and weak header rewards) equals
cR+ cRγTs/Tw · (Tw/Ts−1). Hence, we find that
c =
1
1+ γ(Tw/Ts−1)Ts/Tw ,
5Another way to reach this conclusion is as follows: the number of
weak headers found in a fixed time interval is Poisson distributed, and it can
be shown that the number of Poisson arrivals in an interval with exponen-
tially distributed length is geometrically distributed.
6For an actual block implementation, we advice to introduce separate
spaces for weak headers and transactions. With such a design, miners do not
have incentives and trade-offs between including more transactions instead
of weak headers.
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which for large values of Tw/Ts is close to 1/(1+ γ). This
means that if γ = 1, the strong block and weak header re-
wards contribute almost equally to a miner’s total reward.
5.2 Reward Variance of Solo Mining
The tendency towards centralization in Bitcoin caused by
powerful mining pools can largely be attributed to the high
reward variance of solo mining [15, 37]. Therefore, keeping
the reward variance of a solo miner at a low level is a central
design goal.
Let RBC and RSC be the random variables representing the
per-block rewards for an α-strong solo miner in Bitcoin and
in StrongChain, respectively. For any given strong block in
both protocols, we define the random variable I as follows:
I =
{
1 the block is mined by the solo miner,
0 otherwise.
By definition, I has a Bernoulli distribution, which means
that E(I) = α and Var(I) = α(1−α), where E and Var are
the mean and variance of a random variable respectively. The
following technical lemma will aid our analysis of the reward
variances of solo miners:
Lemma 1. Let X1,X2, . . . be independent and identically dis-
tributed random variables. Let N be defined on {0,1, . . .}
and independent of X1,X2, . . .. Let N and all Xi have finite
mean and variance. Then
Var
(
N
∑
i=1
Xi
)
= E(N)Var(X)+Var(N)(E(X))2.
Proof. See [7].
Reward Variance of Solo Mining in Bitcoin. Bitcoin re-
wards the miner of a block creator with the fixed block re-
ward R and the variable (total) mining fees, which we denote
by the random variable F. Therefore, we have
RBC = I(R+F),
which implies that
Var(RBC) = R2Var(I)+Var(IF). (5)
Since IF = ∑Ii=0 F, we can use Lemma 1 (substituting I for
N and F for X) to obtain
Var(IF) = E(I)Var(F)+Var(I)E2(F). (6)
Combining (5) and (6) gives
Var(RBC) = E(I)Var(F)+Var(I)
(
E2(F)+R2
)
= αVar(F)+α(1−α)
(
E2(F)+R2
)
.
(7)
When the fees are small compared to the mining reward, this
simplifies to α(1−α)R2. By comparison, in [37] the vari-
ance of the block rewards (without fees) earned by a solo
miner across a time period of t seconds is studied, and found
to equal αR2t/600.7 The same quantity can be obtained by
using (7), Lemma 1, and the total number of strong blocks
found (by any miner) after t seconds of mining (which has a
Poisson distribution with mean t/600).
Reward Variance of Solo Mining in StrongChain. For
RSC, we assume that the solo miner has N weak headers in-
cluded in the strong block, and that she obtains cγRTs/Tw
reward per weak header. Then the variance equals
RSC = I(cR+F)+ cγRTs/TwN,
where c is the scaling constant derived in Section 5.1.2.
Hence, by applying Lemma 1, we compute the variance of
RSC as
Var(RSC) = (cR)2Var(I)+Var(IF)
+(cγRTs/Tw)2Var(N).
(8)
The first term, which represents the variance of the strong
block rewards, is similar to Bitcoin but multiplied by c2. If
we choose Tw/Ts = 1024 and γ = 10 (this choice is moti-
vated later in this section), c2 roughly equals 0.0083, which
is quite small. Hence, the strong block rewards have a much
smaller impact on the reward variance in our setting than in
Bitcoin. The second term, which represents the variance of
the fees, is precisely the same as for Bitcoin. The third term
represents the variance of the weak header rewards, which in
turn completely depends on Var(N).
To evaluate Var(N), we again use Lemma 1: let, for any
weak header, J equal 1 if it is found by the solo miner, and
0 otherwise. Also, let L be the total number of weak head-
ers found in the block, so including those not found by the
solo miner. Then N is the sum of L instances of J, where J
has a Bernoulli distribution with success probability α (and
therefore E(J) = α and Var(J) = α(1−α)), and L has a
geometric distribution with success probability Ts/Tw (and
therefore E(L) = Tw/Ts−1 and Var(L) = (Tw/Ts)2−Tw/Ts.
By substituting this into (8), we obtain:
Var(N) = E(L)Var(J)+Var(L)(E(J))2
= (Tw/Ts−1)α(1−α)
+((Tw/Ts)2−Tw/Ts)α2
(9)
Substituting (9) for Var(N) and α(1−α) for Var(I) into (8)
then yields an expression that can be evaluated for different
values of Tw/Ts, γ , and α , as we discuss in the following.
7In particular, it is found to be htR2/(232D), where h = αη and
η/(232D)≈ 1/600.
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Figure 3: Coefficients of variation for the total rewards of α-strong
miners for different strong/weak header difficulty ratios (Tw/Ts = 1
corresponds to Bitcoin). The lines indicate the exact results ob-
tained using our analysis, whereas the markers indicate simulation
results. We used γ = log2(Tw/Ts). The black lines indicate that for
Tw/Ts = 1024, a 0.1%-strong miner has a coefficient of variation
that is comparable to a 9%-strong miner’s in Bitcoin.
Comparison The difference between between (7) and (8)
in practice is illustrated in Figure 3. This is done by com-
paring for a range of different values of α the block rewards’
coefficient of variation, which is the ratio of the square root
of the variance to the mean.
To empirically validate the results, we have also imple-
mented a simulator in Java that can evaluate Bitcoin as well
as StrongChain. We use two nodes, one of which controls a
share α of the hash rate, and another controls a share 1−α .
The nodes can broadcast information about blocks, although
we abstract away from most of the other network behav-
ior. We do not consider transactions (i.e., we mine empty
blocks), and we use a simplified model for the propagation
delays: delays are drawn from a Weibull distribution with
shape parameter 0.6 [31], although for Figure 3 the mean
was chosen to be negligible (more realistic values are chosen
for Table 1).
The black lines in Figure 3 demonstrate that when Tw/Ts =
1024, a miner with share 0.1% of the mining power has the
same coefficient of reward variation as a miner with stake 9%
in Bitcoin. Also note that for Tw/Ts = 1024 and α ≥ 1%, the
coefficient of variation does not substantially decrease any-
more, because nearly all of the reward variance is due to the
number of weak headers. Hence, there would be fewer rea-
sons for miners in our system to join large and cooperative
mining pools, which has a positive effect on the decentral-
ization of the system.
5.3 Chain Quality
One measure for the ‘quality’ of a blockchain is the stale
rate of blocks [16], i.e., the percentage of blocks that ap-
pear during forks and do not make it onto the main chain.
This is closely related to the notion of mining power utiliza-
tion [10], which is the fraction of mining power used for non-
stale blocks. In StrongChain, the stale rate of strong blocks
may increase due to high latency. After all, while a new
block is being propagated through the network, weak head-
ers that strengthen the previous block that are found will be
included by miners in their PoW calculation. As a result,
some miners may refuse to switch to the new block when
it arrives. However, the probability of this happening is very
low: because each weak header only contributes Ts/Tw to the
difficulty of a block, it would take on average 10 minutes to
find enough weak headers to outweigh a block. As we can
see in Table 1, the effect on the stale rate is negligible even
for very high network latencies (i.e., 53 seconds). We also
emphasize that the strong block stale rate is less important in
our setting, as the losing miner still would benefit from her
weak headers appended to the winning block.
Regarding the fairness, defined as the ratio between the
observed share of the rewards (we simulate using one 10%-
strong miner and a 90%-strong one) and the share of the min-
ing power, we see that StrongChain does slightly worse than
Bitcoin for high network latencies. The most likely cause is
that due to the delay in the network, the 10%-strong miner
keeps mining on a chain that has already been extended for
longer than necessary. This gives the miner a slight disad-
vantage compared to the 90%-strong miner.
5.4 Security
One of the main advantages of StrongChain is the added ro-
bustness to selfish mining strategies akin to those discussed
in [11] and [39]. In selfish mining, attackers aim to increase
their share of the earned rewards by tricking other nodes into
mining on top of a block that is unlikely to make it onto the
main chain, thus wasting their mining power. This may come
at a short-term cost, as the chance of the attacker’s blocks go-
ing stale is increased — however, the difficulty rescale that
occurs every 2016 blocks means that if the losses to the hon-
est nodes are structural, the difficulty will go down and the
gains of the attacker will increase.
In the following, we will consider the selfish mining strat-
egy of [11],8 described as follows:
• The attacker does not propagate a newly found block until
she finds at least a second block on top of it, and then only
if the difference in difficulty between her chain and the
strongest known alternative chain is between zero and R.
• The attacker adopts the strongest known alternative chain
if its difficulty is at least greater than her own by R.
8The ‘stubborn mining’ strategy of [39] offers mild improvements over
[11] for powerful miners, but the comparison with StrongChain is similar.
We have also modeled StrongChain using a Markov decision process, in
a way that is similar to the recently proposed framework of [51]. Due to
the state space explosion problem, we could only investigate the protocol
with a small number of expected weak headers, but we have not found any
strategies noticeably that are better than those presented.
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Latency Bitcoin
StrongChain
Tw/Ts = 2 Tw/Ts = 64 Tw/Ts = 1024
γ = 1 γ = 1 γ = 7 γ = 63 γ = 1 γ = 10 γ = 1023
low .0023 .0025 .0021 .0026 .0028 .0023 .0025 .0019
strong stale rate medium .0073 .0082 .0087 .0077 .0078 .0084 .0067 .0081
high .0243 .0297 .0242 .0263 .0247 .0274 .0249 .0263
low — .0043 .0047 .0049 .0046 .0049 .0047 .0047
weak stale rate medium — .0142 .0151 .0154 .0149 .0145 .0147 .0149
high — .0400 .0459 .0474 .0452 .0469 .0455 .0463
low .9966 .9814 .9749 .9747 .9838 .9645 .9809 .9812
fairness medium .9276 .9384 .9570 .9360 .9364 .9329 .9400 .9385
high .7951 .7640 .7978 .7820 .7757 .7756 .7766 .7775
Table 1: For several different protocols, the strong block stale rate, weak header rate, and the ‘fairness’ for an α-strong honest miner with
α = 0.1. Here, fairness is defined as the ratio between the observed share of the reward and the ‘fair’ share of the rewards (i.e, 0.1). ’Low’,
’medium’, and ’high’ latencies refer to the mean of the delay distribution in the simulator; these are roughly 0.53 seconds, 5.3 seconds, and
53 seconds respectively. The simulations are based on a time period corresponding to roughly 20 000 blocks.
In Figure 4a, we have depicted the profitability of this self-
ish mining strategy for different choices of Tw/Ts. As we
can see, for Tw/Ts = 1024 the probability of being ‘ahead’
after two strong blocks is so low that the strategy only be-
gins to pay off when the attackers’ mining power share is
close to 45% — this is an improvement over Bitcoin, where
the threshold is closer to 33%.
StrongChain does introduce new adversarial strategies
based on the mining of new weak headers. Some exam-
ples include not broadcasting any newly found weak blocks
(“reclusive” mining), refusing to include the weak headers
of other miners (“spiteful” mining), and postponing the pub-
lication of a new strong block and wasting the weak headers
found by other miners in the meantime. In the former case,
the attacker risks losing their weak blocks, whereas in both of
the latter two cases, the attacker risks their strong block go-
ing stale as other blocks and weak headers are found. Hence,
these are not cost-free strategies. Furthermore, because the
number of weak headers does not affect the difficulty rescale,
the attacker’s motive for increasing the stale rate of other
miners’ weak headers is less obvious (although in the long
run, an adversarial miner could push other miners out of the
market entirely, thus affecting the difficulty rescale).
In Figure 4b, we have displayed the relative payout (with
respect to the total rewards) of a reclusive α-strong miner —
this strategy does not pay for any α < 0.5. In Figure 4c, we
have depicted the relative payoff of a spiteful mine who does
not include other miners’ weak blocks unless necessary (i.e.,
unless others’ weak blocks together contribute more than R
to the difficulty, which would mean that any single block
found by the spiteful miner would always go stale). For low
latencies (the graphs were generated with an average latency
of 0.53 seconds), the strategy is almost risk-free, and the at-
tacker does manage to hurt other miners more than herself,
leading to an increased relative payout. However, as dis-
played in Figure 4d, there are no absolute gains, even mild
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Figure 4: Payoffs of an α-strong adversarial miner for different
strategies. Figure (a): relative payoff of a selfish miner following
the strategy of [11], compared to an (1−α)-strong honest miner.
Figure (b): relative payoff of a reclusive miner who does not broad-
cast her weak blocks. Figure (c): relative payoff (with respect to
the rewards of all miners combined) of a spiteful miner, who does
not include other miners’ weak blocks unless necessary. Figure
(d): absolute payoff of a spiteful miner, with 12.5 BTC on aver-
age awarded per block. We consider Bitcoin and StrongChain with
different choices of Tw/Ts, with γ = log2(Tw/Ts).
losses. As mentioned earlier, the weak headers do not af-
fect the difficulty rescale so there is no short-term incentive
to engage in this behavior — additionally there is little gain
in computational overhead as the attacker still needs to pro-
cess her own weak headers. In Section 6.1 we will discuss
protocol updates that can mitigate these strategies regardless.
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Figure 5: The deviation from the network time that an α-strong
adversary can introduce for its mined blocks by slowing (the left
graph) and accelerating (the right graph) timestamps.
5.5 More Reliable Timestamps
Finally, we conducted a series of simulations to investigate
how the introduced redefinition of timestamps interpretation
(see getTimestamp() in Algorithm 1 and Section 4.5) influ-
ences the timestamp reliability in an adversarial setting. We
assume that an adversary wants to deviate blockchain times-
tamps by as much as possible. There are two strategies for
such an attack, i.e., an adversary can either “slow down”
timestamps or “accelerate” them. In the former attack, the
best adversary’s strategy is to use the minimum acceptable
timestamp in every header created by the adversary. Namely,
the adversary sets its timestamps to the median value of the
last eleven blocks (a header with a lower timestamp would
not be accepted by the network – see Section 2.2). As for the
latter attack, the adversary can analogously bias timestamps
towards the future by putting the maximum acceptable value
in all her created headers. The maximum timestamp value
accepted by network nodes is two hours in the future with re-
spect to the nodes’ internal clocks (any header with a higher
timestamp would be rejected).
In our study, we assume that honest nodes maintain the
network time which the adversary tries to deviate from. We
consider the worst-case scenario, which is when the adver-
sary, who also biases all her header timestamps, mines the
strong block. We measure (over 10000 runs) how such a
malicious timestamp can be mitigated by our redefinition of
the block timestamps interpretation. We present the obtained
results in Figure 5, and as shown in the slow-down case
our protocol achieves much more precise timestamps than
Bitcoin (the difference is around 2000 seconds). Similarly,
when the adversary accelerates timestamps, our protocol can
mitigate it effectively, adjusting the adversarial timestamps
by 2000-3500 seconds towards the correct time. This ef-
fect is achieved due to the block’s timestamp calculation as a
weighted average of all block headers. The adversary could
try to remove honest participants’ weak headers in order to
give a stronger weight to its malicious timestamps, but in
Section 6.1 we discuss ways to mitigate it.
6 Discussion
6.1 Impact of the Parameter Choice
The results presented in Section 5 required several parame-
ters to be fixed. First of all, we had to choose γ , which de-
termines the relative contribution of the weak headers to the
total mining rewards. Second, there is the contribution of the
weak blocks to the chain difficulty, which in the chainPoW()
function in Algorithm 1 was set to be only Tmax/Tw. This
means that the PoW of a weak header relative to a strong
block’s PoW — we call this the difficulty factor — is fixed
to be Ts/Tw. In the following, we first discuss the relevant
trade-offs and then motivate our choice.
When both γ and the difficulty factor are low, the impact
on the reward variance of the miners (as per Figure 3) will be
mild as the strong block rewards still constitute about 50%
of the mining rewards. This reliance on the block rewards
also means that ‘spiteful’ mining as discussed in Section 5.4
is disincentivized as the risk of strong blocks going stale still
has a considerable impact on total rewards. However, selfish
mining as proposed in [11] relies on several blocks in a row
being mined in secret, and even for a low difficulty factor it
becomes much harder for the attacker’s chain to stay ‘ahead’
of the honest chain, as the latter accumulates strength from
the weak headers at a faster rate. Hence, in this setting we
only gain protection against selfish mining.
When γ is high but the difficulty factor is not (which is
the setting of Section 5), then in addition to disincentivizing
selfish mining, the reward variances become much less de-
pendent on the irregular strong block rewards. This benefits
small miners and reduces centralization, as we also discuss
in Section 6.2. However, spiteful mining will have more of
an impact as the possible downside (i.e., a latency-dependent
increase in the strong block stale rate) will have less of an ef-
fect on the total rewards.
When both γ and the difficulty factor are high, the impact
of spiteful mining is mitigated. The reason is that blocks
quickly accumulate enough weak headers to outweigh a
strong block, and in this case spiteful miners need to adopt
the other weak blocks or risk their strong block becoming
stale with certainty. The downside in this setting is that the
system-wide block stale rate is increased. For example, if
each weak header contributes γTs/Tw to the difficulty and
γ = 10, then after (on average) one minute enough weak
headers are found to outweigh a strong block, and if prop-
agation of the block takes longer than one minute then some
miners will not adopt the block, increasing the likelihood of
a fork.
In this paper, we have chosen the second of the three ap-
proaches — a moderately high γ , yet a minor difficulty fac-
tor. The reason is that the only downside (spiteful mining)
was considered less of a concern than the other downsides
(namely a low impact on reward variances and a higher block
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stale rate respectively) for two reasons: a) because spiteful
mining does not lead to clear gains for the attacker, and b)
because it only has a large impact on other miners’ profits
if the attacker controls a large share of the mining power,
whereas the emergence of large mining pools is exactly what
StrongChain discourages. The specific value of γ = 10 for
Tw/Ts = 1024 (or γ = log2(Tw/Ts) in general) was chosen
to sufficiently reduce mining reward variances, yet leaving
some incentive to discourage spiteful mining.
The protocol can be further extended to disincentivize
spiteful mining, e.g., by additionally awarding strong block
finders a reward that is proportional to the number of weak
headers included. This would make StrongChain more simi-
lar to Ethereum, where stale block (‘uncle’) rewards are paid
both to the miner of a stale block and the miner of the suc-
cessful block that included it (see Section 8 for additional
discussion of Ethereum’s protocol). However, we leave such
modifications and their consequences as future work.
6.2 StrongChain and Centralized Mining
Decentralized mining pools aim to reduce variance while
providing benefits for the system (i.e., trust minimization for
pools, and a higher number of validating nodes). However,
mining in Bitcoin is in fact dominated by centralized mining
pools whose value proposition, over decentralized pools, is
an easy setup and participation. Therefore, rational miners
motivated by their own benefit, instead of joining decentral-
ized pools prefer centralized “plug-and-play” mining. It is
still debatable whether centralized mining pools are benefi-
cial or harmful to the system. However, it has been proved
multiple times, that the concentration of significant comput-
ing power caused by centralized mining is risky and should
be avoided, as such a strong pool has multiple ways of mis-
behaving and becomes a single point of failure in the system.
One example is the pool GHash.IO, which in 2014 achieved
more than 51% of the mining power. This undermined trust
in the Bitcoin network to the extent that the pool was forced
to actively ask miners to join other pools [12].
In order to follow incentives of rational miners,
StrongChain does not require any radical changes from them
and is compatible with centralized mining pools; however, it
is specifically designed to mitigate their main security risk
(i.e., power centralization). In StrongChain such pools could
be much smaller than in Bitcoin (due to minimized vari-
ance) and to support this argument we conducted a study.
We listed the largest Bitcoin mining pools and their shares
in the global mining power (according to https://www.
blockchain.com/en/pools as for the time of writing).
Then for each pool, we calculated what would be the pool
size in StrongChain to offer the miner the same payout vari-
ance experience, and the variance reduction factor in that
case. As shown in Table 2, for the Bitcoin largest min-
ing pool with 18.1% of the global hash rate, an equivalent
Mining Pool Pool Size SizeBitcoin StrongChain Reduction
BTC.com 18.1% 0.245% 74×
F2Pool 14.1% 0.172% 82×
AntPool 11.7% 0.135% 87×
SlushPool 9.1% 0.099% 92×
ViaBTC 7.5% 0.079% 95×
BTC.TOP 7.1% 0.074% 96×
BitClub 3.1% 0.030% 103×
DPOOL 2.6% 0.025% 104×
Bitcoin.com 1.9% 0.018% 106×
BitFury 1.7% 0.016% 106×
Table 2: Largest Bitcoin mining pools and the corresponding pool
sizes in StrongChain offering the same relative reward variance
(Tw/Ts = 1024 and γ = 10).
pool in StrongChain (to provide miners the same reward ex-
perience) could be as small as 0.245% of the hash rate –
around 74 times smaller. Even better reduction factors are
achieved for smaller pools. Therefore, our study indicates
that StrongChain makes the size of a pool almost an irrel-
evant factor for miners’ benefits (i.e., there is no objective
advantage of joining a large pool over a medium or a small
one). Therefore we envision that with StrongChain, central-
ized mining pools will naturally be much more distributed.
Limitations
As discussed, it is beneficial for the system if as many par-
ticipants as possible independently run full nodes; however,
miners join large centralized pools not only due to high re-
ward variance. Other potential reasons include the minimiza-
tion of operational expenses as running a full node is a large
overhead, higher efficiency since large pools may use high-
performance hardware and network, better ability to earn ex-
tra income from merge mining [29], better protection against
various attacks, anonymity benefits, etc. This work focuses
on removing the reward variance reason. Although we be-
lieve that StrongChain would produce a larger number of
small pools in a natural way, it does not eliminate the other
reasons, so some large centralized pools may still remain.
Luckily, our system is orthogonal to multiple concurrent so-
lutions. For instance, StrongChain could be easily combined
with non-outsourceable puzzle schemes (see Section 8) to in-
crease the number of full nodes by explicitly disincentivizing
miners from outsourcing their computing power. We leave
such a combination as interesting future work.
7 Realization in Practice
We implemented our system in order to investigate its feasi-
bility and confirm the stated properties. We implemented a
StrongChain full node with interactive client in Python, and
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our implementation includes the complete logic from Algo-
rithm 1 and all functionalities required to have a fully opera-
tional system (communication modules, message types, val-
idation logic, etc...).9 As described before, the main changes
in our implementation to the Bitcoin’s block layout are:
• a new (20B-long) Coinbase header field,
• a new binding transaction protecting all weak headers
of the block,
• removed original coinbase transaction,
where a binding transaction has a single (32B-long) output
as presented in Equation 3.10
Weak headers introduced by our system impact the band-
width and storage overhead (when compared with Bitcoin).
Due to compressing them (see Section 4.2), the size of a sin-
gle weak header in a block is 60B. For example, with an
average number of weak headers equal 1024, the storage and
bandwidth overhead increases by about 61.5KB per block
(e.g., with 64 weak headers, the overhead is only 3.8KB).
Taking into account the average Bitcoin block size of about
1MB (the average between 15 Oct and 15 Nov 201811),
1024 weak headers constitute around 6.1% of today’s blocks,
while 64 headers only 0.4%. The same overhead is intro-
duced to SPV clients, that besides a strong header need to
obtain weak headers and a proof for their corresponding
binding transaction. Thus, an SPV update (every 10 min-
utes) would be 61.5KB or 3.8KB on average for 1024 or
64 weak headers, respectively. However, since only strong
headers authenticate transactions, SPV clients do not need
to store weak headers and after they are validated, they can
remove them (they need to just calculate and associate their
aggregated PoW with the strong header). Such an approach
would not introduce any noticeable storage overhead on SPV
clients.
Nodes validate all incoming weak headers; however, this
overhead is a single hash computation and simple sanity
checks per header. Even with our unoptimized implemen-
tation running on a commodity PC the total validation of
a single weak header takes around 50µs on average (i.e.,
51ms per 1024 headers on a single core). Given that we do
not believe this overhead can lead to more serious denial-of-
service attacks than ones already known and existing in Bit-
coin (e.g., spamming with large invalid blocks). Addition-
ally, StrongChain can adopt prevention techniques present in
Bitcoin, like blacklisting misbehaving peers.
9Our implementation is available at https://github.com/ivan-
homoliak-sutd/strongchain-demo/.
10An alternative choice is to store a hash of weak headers in a header
itself. Although simpler, that option would incur a higher overhead if the
number of weak headers is greater than several.
11https://www.blockchain.com/en/charts/avg-block-size
8 Related work
Employing weak solutions (and their variations) in Bitcoin is
an idea [36,38] circulating on Bitcoin forums for many years.
Initial proposals leverage weak solutions (i.e., weak blocks)
for faster transaction confirmations [45,46], for signaling the
current working branch of particular miners [13,14,30]. Un-
fortunately, most of these proposals come without necessary
details or lack rigorous analysis. Below, we discuss the most
related attempts that have been made to utilize weak or stale
blocks in PoW-based decentralized consensus protocols. We
compare these systems in Table 3 according to their reward
and PoW calculation schemes.
Subchains. Rizun proposes Subchains [35], where a chain
of weak blocks (a so-called subchain) bridging each pair of
subsequent strong blocks is created. The design of Subchain
puts a special focus on increasing the transaction through-
put and the double-spend security for unconfirmed transac-
tions. Rizun argues that since the (weak) block interval of
subchains is much smaller than the strong block interval, it
allows for faster (weak) transaction confirmations. Another
claimed advantage of such an approach is that during the
process of building subchains, the miners can detect forks
earlier, and take actions accordingly to avoid wasting com-
putational power. However, the design of Subchain sidesteps
a concrete security analysis at the subchain level. In detail,
by using a chaining data structure where one weak header
referencing the previous weak header in a subchain, it intro-
duces high stale rate on a subchain. More importantly, due
to applying a Bitcoin-like subchain selection policy in case
of conflicts, this approach is vulnerable to the selfish mining
attack launched on a subchain.
Flux. Based on similar ideas as Subchain, Zamyatin et al.
propose Flux [49]. In contrast to Subchain, Flux shares re-
wards (from newly minted coins and transaction fees) evenly
among the finders of weak and strong blocks according to
the computational resources they invested. This approach
reduces the reward variance of miners, and therefore miti-
gates the need for large mining pools, which is beneficial for
the system’s decentralization. In addition, simulation exper-
iments show that Flux renders selfish mining on the main
chain less profitable. However, alike Subchains, Flux em-
ploys a chain structure for weak blocks, which inevitably in-
troduces race conditions, increasing the stale rate of weak
blocks and making it more susceptible to selfish mining at-
tacks at the subchain level. The designers of Flux let both
of these issues open and discuss the potential application of
GHOST [41] to subchains. Another limitation of this work
is that the authors do not analyze the requirements on space
consumption when putting possibly a high number of over-
lapping transactions into Flux subchains, which could nega-
tively influence network, storage, and processing resources.
Remarks on Subchain and Flux. One important difference
between our approach and the above two designs is that we
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Bitcoin v0.1 Bitcoin Fruitchains Flux StrongChain
Reward (strong) R+F R+F 0 (R+F)/(E +1) cR+F
Reward (weak) 0 0 (R+F)/E (R+F)/(E +1) cγRTs/Tw
Chain weight contrib. (strong) 1 Tmax/Ts Tmax/Ts Tmax/Ts Tmax/Ts
Chain weight contrib. (weak) 0 0 0 0 Tmax/Tw
Table 3: The comparison of reward and PoW computation schemes of StrongChain and the related systems. (F : block transaction fees, E:
expected number of weak headers per block. The entries for Flux are approximations for the PPLNS scheme in P2Pool, on which it is based.)
adopt a flat hierarchy for the weak blocks, which not only
eliminates the possibility of selfish mining in a set of weak
solutions, but also avoids the issue of stale rate of weak
blocks. In contrast, both Subchain and Flux employ a chain
structure for weak blocks, inevitably making them more sus-
ceptible to selfish mining attacks at the subchain level. More-
over, in our approach rewards are not shared, therefore min-
ers can only benefit from appending received weak solutions.
In addition, none of Subchain and Flux provide a concrete
implementation demonstrating their applicability.
FruitChains. Another approach to address the mining vari-
ance and selfish mining issues is the FruitChains protocol
proposed by Pass and Shi [32]. In FruitChains, instead of di-
rectly storing the records inside blocks, the records or trans-
actions are put inside “fruits” with relatively low mining dif-
ficulties. Fruits then are appended to a blockchain via blocks
which are mined with a higher difficulty. Mined fruits and
blocks yield rewards, hence, miners can be paid more often
and there is no need to form a mining pool.
However, some practical and technical details of
FruitChains lead to undesired side effects. First, the scheme
allows fruits with small difficulties to be announced and ac-
cepted by other miners. With too small difficulty it could
render high transmission overheads or even potential denial-
of-service attacks and its effects on the network are not in-
vestigated. On the other hand, too high fruit difficulty could
result in a low transaction throughput and a high reward vari-
ance. Second, duplicate fruits are discarded, even though
they might be found by different miners – this naturally im-
plies some stale fruit rate (uninvestigated in the paper). Sim-
ilarly, it is unclear would a block finder have an incentive
to treat all fruits equally and to not prioritize her mined
fruits (especially when fruits are associated with transac-
tion fees). Moreover, fruits that are not appended to the
blockchain quickly enough have to be mined and broadcast
again, rendering additional overheads. Finally, the descrip-
tion of FruitChains lacks important details (e.g., the size of
the fruits or the overheads introduced) as well as an actual
implementation.
GHOST and Ethereum. An alternative approach for de-
creasing a high reward variance of miners is to shorten the
block creation rate to the extent that does not hurt the over-
all system security – such an approach increases transac-
tion throughput as well. The Greedy Heaviest-Observed
Sub-Tree (GHOST) chain selection rule [41] makes use of
stale blocks to increase the weight of their ancestors, which
achieves a 600 fold speedup for the block generation com-
pared to Bitcoin, while preserving its security strength. De-
spite the inclusion of stale blocks in the blockchain, only the
miners of the main chain get rewards for the inclusion of the
stale blocks.
In contrast to the original GHOST, the white and yellow
papers of Ethereum [44, 48] propose to reward also miners
of stale blocks in order to further increase the security –
not wasting with the consumed resources for mining of stale
blocks. However, Ritz and Zugenmaier shows that rewarding
so called “uncle blocks” lowers the threshold at which self-
ish mining is profitable [34] – a selfish miner can built-up
the “heaviest” chain, as she can reference blocks previously
not broadcast to the honest network. Likewise, the inclu-
sive blockchain protocol [20], which increases the transac-
tion throughput, but leaves the selfish mining issue unsolved.
DAG-based Protocols. SPECTRE [40] is an example of
the protocols family that leverages a directed acyclic graph
(DAG). This family proposed more radical design changes
motivated by the observation that one essential through-
put limitation of Nakamoto consensus is the data struc-
ture leveraged which can be maintained only sequentially.
SPECTRE generalizes the Nakamoto’s blockchain into a
DAG of blocks, while allowing miners to add blocks con-
currently with a high frequency, just basing on their indi-
vidual current views of the DAG. Such a design provides
multiple advantages over chain-based protocols including
StrongChain. Frequently published blocks increase transac-
tion throughput and provide fast confirmation times while
relaxed consistency requirements allow to tolerate propaga-
tion delays. Like StrongChain, SPECTRE also aims to de-
crease mining reward variance, but achieves it again via fre-
quent blocks. However, frequent blocks have a side effect of
transaction redundancy which negatively impacts the stor-
age and transmission overheads, and this aspect was not in-
vestigated. Moreover, SPECTRE provides a weaker prop-
erty than chain-based consensus protocols as simultaneously
added transactions cannot be ordered. This and schemes fol-
lowing a similar design are payments oriented and to support
order-specific applications, like smart contracts, they need to
be enhanced with an additional ordering logic.
More recently, Sompolinsky and Zohar [42] proposed two
DAG-based protocols improving the prior work. PHAN-
TOM introduces and uses a greedy algorithm (called the
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GHOSTDAG protocol) to determine the order of transac-
tions. This eliminates the applicability issues of SPECTRE,
but for the cost of slowing down transaction confirmation
times. Combining advantages of PHANTOM and SPECTRE
into a full system was left by the authors as a future work.
Decentralization-oriented Schemes. Mining decentraliza-
tion was a goal of multiple previous proposals. One direc-
tion is to design mining such that miners do not have incen-
tive to outsource resources or forming coalitions. Perma-
coin [25] is an early attempt to achieve it where miners in-
stead of proving their work prove that their store (fragments
of) a globally-agreed file. Permacoin is designed such that:
a) payment private keys are bound to puzzle solutions – out-
sourcing private keys is risky for miners, b) sequential and
random storage access is critical for the mining efficiency,
thus it disincentives miners from outsourcing data. If the file
is valuable, then a side-effect of Permacoin is its usefulness,
as miners replicate the file.
The notion of non-outsourceable mining was further ex-
tended and other schemes were proposed [26, 50]. Miller
et al. [26] introduces “strongly non-outsourceable puzzles”
that aim to disincentivize pool creation by requiring all pool
participants to remain honest. In short, with these puz-
zles any pool participant can steal the pool reward without
revealing its identity. The scheme relies on zero knowl-
edge proofs requiring a trusted setup and introducing sig-
nificant computational overheads. The scheme is orthogo-
nal to StrongChain and could be integrated with easily inte-
grated with StrongChain, however, after a few years of their
introduction no system of this class was actually deployed at
scale; thus, we do not have any empirical results confirming
their promised benefits.
SmartPool is a different approach that was proposed by
Luu et al. [23]. In SmartPool, the functionality of mining
pools was implemented as a smart contract. Such an ap-
proach runs natively only on smart-contract platforms but it
allows to eliminate actual mining pools and their managers
(note that SmartPool still imposes fees for running smart
contracts), while preserving most benefits of pool mining.
Rewarding Schemes for Mining Pools. Mining pools di-
vide the block reward (together with the transaction fees) in
such a way that each miner joining the pool is paid his fair
share in proportion to his contribution. Typically, the con-
tribution of an individual miner in the pool is witnessed by
showing weak solutions called shares.
There are various rewarding schemes that mining pools
employ. The simplest and most natural method is the propor-
tional scheme where the reward of a strong block is divided
in proportion to the numbers of shares submitted by the min-
ers. However, this scheme leads to pool hopping attacks [33].
To avoid this security issue, many other rewarding systems
are developed, including the Pay-per-last-N-shares (PPLNS)
scheme and its variants. We refer the reader to [37] for a
systematic analysis of different pool rewarding systems.
The reward mechanisms in StrongChain can be seen con-
ceptually as a mining pool built-in into the protocol. How-
ever, there are important differences between our design
and the mining pools. The most contrasting one is that in
StrongChain rewarding is not a zero-sum game and miners
do not share rewards. In mining pools, all rewards are shared
and this characteristic causes multiple in- and cross-pool at-
tacks that cannot be launched against our scheme. Further-
more, the miner collaboration within Bitcoin mining pools
is a “necessary evil”, while in StrongChain the collaboration
is beneficial for miners and the overall system. We discuss
StrongChain and mining pools further in Section 6.2.
9 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a transparent and collaborative
proof-of-work protocol. Our approach is based on Nakamoto
consensus and Bitcoin, however, we modified their core de-
signs. In particular, in contrast to them, we take advantage
of weak solutions, which although they do not finalize a
block creation positively contribute to the blockchain proper-
ties. We also proposed a rewarding scheme such that miners
can benefit from exchanging and appending weak solutions.
These modifications lead to a more secure, fair, and efficient
system. Surprisingly, we show that our approach helps with
seemingly unrelated issues like the freshness property. Fi-
nally, our implementation indicates the efficiency and de-
ployability of our approach.
Incentives-oriented analysis of consensus protocols is a
relatively new topic and in the future we would like to extend
our work by modeling our protocol with novel frameworks
and tools. Another topic worth investigating in future is how
to combine StrongChain with systems solving other draw-
backs of Nakamoto consensus [10, 19, 21], or how to mimic
the protocol in the proof-of-stake setting.
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